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The Limits of Isomorphism: Global Investment Law 
and the ASEAN Investment Regime 
Sungjoon Cho* and Jürgen Kurtz** 
Abstract 
 
This Article probes the unique ontogenetic path of ASEAN’s regulation of foreign 
investment by juxtaposing global investment law with the ASEAN investment regime. While 
the former delivers a powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN exhibits in its strong 
reflection of global investment norms, the latter sheds critical light on ideological and analytical 
blind spots by exploring distinct heterogeneities in ASEAN’s investment regulation. Those 
heterogeneities, especially preferences towards non-legal forms of cooperation and tailored 
flexibilities to pursue public and development outcomes, are not simply outliers, but reflect 
important historical and cultural values inherent to ASEAN and its members. The insights 
uncovered in this Article invite scholars and policymakers to define a new form of global 
investment law that is more inclusive and flexible than the strict and conventional paradigm.  
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I.  INTRODUCTION  
Southeast Asia is rife with gloomy collective memories. Its colonial past was 
followed by post-war geopolitical conflict and turbulence, including foreign 
interventions in Vietnam and Laos, as well as military hostilities between 
Indonesia and Malaysia. Ideological economic strategies designed to promote 
welfare in the region in the wake of this turbulence, such as import substitution, 
proved disappointing in their ability to deliver sustainable levels of economic 
growth and development outcomes.1 Nonetheless, those states interlinked around 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) shifted their economic 
paradigm from a closed to open economy in the 1980s.2 Ever since, trade and 
investment flows in and out of this area have been nothing short of spectacular. 
Between 1990 and 2014, the investment inflow to, and outflow from, this region 
have increased approximately ten times and thirty-four times, respectively.3 By 
2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) flows to ASEAN exceeded inflows to 
China, making it the largest recipient of FDI in the developing world.4 
Notably, this paradigm shift from a closed to an open economy through 
liberalization of trade and investment restrictions by ASEAN countries has been 
powered by a thick set of global norms. A variety of treaties provided ASEAN 
nations with modern regulatory platforms necessary to integrate their economies 
into the global market. At the same time as the ASEAN nations were becoming 
more involved in the global market, policymakers and private practitioners from 
developed countries, as well as international organizations—such as the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank—offered their technical 
assistance to the ASEAN nations in adopting neoliberal reform in the areas of 
trade and investment liberalization.5 Naturally, ASEAN nations relied heavily on 
general legal principles and templates, such as model bilateral investment treaties 
(BITs) originally created by developed states and then dispersed mimetically.  
                                                 
1  For exploration of the theory, adoption, and subsequent limits of import substitution as a 
development strategy, see MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK & ROBERT HOWSE, THE REGULATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 486, 486–88 (3d ed. 2005). 
2  See generally THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF INTEGRATION IN ASIA AND THE PACIFIC (Shiro 
Armstrong ed., 2011). 
3  FDI Statistics Division on Investment and Enterprise, UNCTAD, 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics.aspx, 2 April 2016. 
4  ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Investment Report, at xv (2015), https://perma.cc/W7YR-KJTB. 
5  On the imposition of structural adjustment conditions in the lending policies of international 
financial institutions such as the International Monetary Fund, see TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra 
note 1, at 486–91. 
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Nonetheless, isomorphism of this benchmarking type (mimetic 
isomorphism)6 does not necessarily mean identical treaty products 
(“equifinality”).7 Despite general convergence into global patterns in the basic 
legal structure and tenets, both the individual ASEAN BITs (signed between 
ASEAN nations and non-ASEAN nations) and the collective ASEAN investment 
regime (AIR) (addressing intra-ASEAN investment flows) feature unique 
departures from the global investment model. There is a temptation to dismiss 
these departures as mere outliers. This Article, however, takes those 
heterogeneities seriously and explores a structural explanation by juxtaposing 
world polity theory and historical institutionalism. While the former delivers a 
powerful heuristic on isomorphism that ASEAN BITs and AIR demonstrate in 
their manifestations toward Global Investment Law (GIL), the latter tends to 
complement the former by shedding critical light on the ideological and analytical 
blind spots exposed by those heterogeneities. 
Against this background, Section II begins by defining GIL as an extensive 
and thick network of BITs, investment chapters of certain regional trade 
agreements, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement’s (NAFTA) 
Chapter 11, and investment arbitration decisions derived from these primary 
sources. GIL is a relatively congruent legal regime whose original development 
has been nurtured by key developed countries, such as the U.S. and the E.U. 
member-states, since the 1980s. Those BITs and investment chapters comprising 
GIL are substantively similar, largely because of: (a) asymmetry of negotiating 
power with smaller states forced to act as law-takers; and (b) the automatic 
tendency—until recently—to replicate those terms throughout the network. In 
explaining both the emergence and prevalence of GIL, we employ world polity 
theory. According to this theory, GIL as a world investment culture holds a 
homogenizing effect over the AIR. Section III contrasts this converging force of 
GIL with key diverging trends within AIR. Certain tailoring of AIR is 
substantively and conceptually distinct to GIL, sometimes in problematic ways. 
From a comparative perspective, we highlight the uniqueness of AIR vis-à-vis 
GIL, including the striking asymmetry between extra-ASEAN and intra-ASEAN 
investment liberalization (“reverse open regionalism”) as well as departures from 
a body of GIL classically represented by Chapter 11 of NAFTA. Here, we can 
                                                 
6  See generally Paul J. DiMaggio & Walter W. Powell, The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and 
Collective Rationality in Organizational Fields, 48 AM. SOC. REV. 147 (1983). 
7  MARTHA FINNEMORE, NATIONAL INTERESTS IN INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY 138–39 (Peter J. 
Katzenstein ed., 1996). 
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benefit from “historical institutionalism” in tracing ASEAN’s unique path-
dependency, such as in its own vaunted “ASEAN Way.”8 
The insights uncovered in this Article hold broader implications beyond 
ASEAN. World polity or world culture is real, and its homogenizing power is 
undeniable. A vast network of transnational norm entrepreneurs—both public 
and private—offers recipients of such culture concrete manuals in the form of 
treaties and other regulations. In this regard, the “norm lifecycle” model—norm 
emergence, norm cascade, and internalization—is useful in grappling with this 
homogenizing process and its implications.9 Yet, despite its strong gravitational 
pull, world culture’s converging power should be placed into careful perspective. 
A number of factors, such as subject matter, may lead receivers of world culture 
to emulate the global script selectively rather than indiscriminately.10 In this sense, 
globalization may be “the two-fold process involving the universalization of 
particularism and the particularization of universalism.”11 We should caution 
against the “inevitability assumption”12 that underlies world polity theory. One 
may want to ask “what is happening in ASEAN regarding international economic 
governance?” rather than “how is ASEAN’s investment liberalization going?”13 
As Daniel Lynch aptly observes, “rather than . . . viewing states as either already 
socialized or certainly on the way to becoming socialized into the [global] 
constitutive norms . . . it is significantly more satisfying to view states as choosing 
to embrace some norms while rejecting others fundamentally.”14 Indeed, the push 
to selectivity is given added momentum when one considers that global norms 
                                                 
8  The “ASEAN Way” is a sovereignty-preserving, non-interference principle formed through the 
unique post-war experiences of ASEAN nations. The ASEAN Way has shaped not only geopolitical 
but also economic policies in the ASEAN region. Vinod K. Aggarwal & Jonathan T. Chow, The 
Perils of Consensus: How ASEAN’s Meta-Regime Undermines Economic and Environmental Cooperation, 17 
REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 262 (2010); Gillian Goh, The ‘ASEAN’ Way: Non-Intervention and ASEAN’s 
Role in Conflict Management, 3 STAN. J. E. ASIAN AFF. 113 (2003); Lee Jones, ASEAN and the Norm of 
Non-Interference in Southeast Asia: A Quest for Social Order (Nuffield C. Pol. Grp., Working Paper, 2009). 
9  Martha Finnemore & Kathryn Sikkink, International Norm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT’L ORG. 
887, 895 (1998). 
10  Roland Robertson, Glocalization: Time-Space and Homogeniety-Heterogeneity, in GLOBAL MODERNITIES 
41 (Mike Featherstone et al. eds., 1995). 
11  ROLAND ROBERTSON, GLOBALIZATION: SOCIAL THEORY AND GLOBAL CULTURE 102 (Mike 
Featherstone ed., 1992). 
12  Daniel C. Lynch, International "Decentering" and Democratization: The Case of Thailand, 48 INT. STUD. Q. 
339, 341 (2004). 
13  See Thomas Carothers, The End of the Transition Paradigm, 13 J. DEMOCRACY 5, 17–18 (2002). 
14  Lynch, supra note 12, at 345. 
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(such as GIL) are not in complete coherence within themselves.15 This yields 
contradictory claims and interpretations of the global norms by some states.16 
The limits of functionalism—or rationalism—embedded in historical 
institutionalism teaches us that inter-state haggling may not be the only pathway 
to international cooperation. The values inherent in historical and cultural 
contexts are incalculable and, therefore, not prone to simple reciprocal bargaining. 
International negotiators should take these contexts of their counterparts into 
careful account before advancing market-opening requests and seek to negotiate 
sustainable international commitments through communication and dialogue. 
Indeed, a certain institutional heterogeneity departing from the world polity may 
subsequently become a global trend itself. Some observers have been struck by 
the prescience of the ASEAN states because of the way in which they remodeled 
the ASEAN investment treaty in light of the Asian financial crisis. We are only 
now seeing other states belatedly inserting flexibilities for financial restrictions, 
such as capital controls, particularly in the E.U., as they had been overly influenced 
by the orthodox position prosecuted aggressively under the neoliberal mantra. 
Ironic as it may sound, some local deviations from world culture may become 
internationalized.17 
II.  GLOBAL INVESTMENT LAW AND THE ASEAN  INVESTMENT 
REGIME  
A.  Conceptualizing Global Investment Law  
By interpreting various aspects of international relations, such as interstate 
cooperation, through global norms and value and meaning structure, world polity 
theory provides the theoretical underpinning of GIL. World polity theory is a 
macro-structural theory in that it emphasizes the broad “cultural” background that 
shapes states’ identities and actions. Furthermore, as an institutionalist theory, it 
shares its sociological tradition with Emile Durkheim (“collective 
representation”)18 and Pierre Bourdieu (“field”).19 John Meyer and the Stanford 
school developed this theory in an effort to understand the phenomenon of post-
war globalization.20 In particular, the theory was developed in order to understand 
                                                 
15  FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 137–138. 
16  Id. at 138. 
17  Id. at 136. 
18  EMILE DURKHEIM, ELEMENTARY FORMS OF RELIGIOUS LIFE 22 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1915). 
19  See Pierre Bourdieu, Social Space and Symbolic Power, 7 SOC. THEORY 14, 14–16 (1989). 
20  See generally John Boli et al., World Society, World-Polity Theory and International Relations, in 
INTERNATIONAL STUDIES ENCYCLOPEDIA (Robert A. Denmark ed., 2010). 
Chicago Journal of International Law 
 346 Vol. 17 No. 2 
normative and institutional convergence and isomorphism.21 Meyer et al. 
epitomize world polity theory as follows: 
The development and impact of global sociocultural structuration greatly 
intensified with the creation of a central world organizational frame at the end 
of World War II. In place of the League of Nations, which was a limited 
international security organization, the United Nations system and related 
bodies (the International Monetary Fund, World Bank, General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade [GATT]) established expanded agendas of concern for 
international society, including economic development, individual rights, and 
medical, scientific, and educational development. This framework of global 
organization and legitimation greatly facilitated the creation and assembly of 
expansive components of an active and influential world society.22 
At the heart of world polity theory lies the thesis of inevitability and 
convergence. Bjorn Wittrock argues that “modernity is a global condition that 
now affects all our actions, interpretations, and habits, across nations and 
irrespective of which civilizational roots we may have or lay claim to.”23 Likewise, 
Martha Finnemore observes that “Weberian rationality is marching relentlessly 
across the earth, leaving in its wake a marketized, bureaucratized world of 
increasingly similar forms.”24 Therefore, as a symbol of modernization, world 
culture is naturalized and thus normativized as if this process was inevitable.25 This 
inevitability thesis understands economic development in terms of cultural 
isomorphism,26 in contrast to a “world-systems theory” that focuses on 
stratification, such as core versus periphery, from a materialist perspective.27 
The inevitability and convergence thesis underlying world polity theory tends 
to determine its investigative methodologies. For example, if an unknown society 
was discovered, world polity theorists would analyze its economy “with standard 
types of data, organizations, and policies for domestic and international 
                                                 
21  Connie McNeely, World Polity Theory, in THE WILEY-BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
GLOBALIZATION 2316, 2316–17 (George Ritzer ed., 2012). 
22  John Meyer et al., World Society and the Nation-State, 103 AM. J. SOC. 144, 163 (1997) (citation omitted). 
23  Bjorn Wittrock, Modernity: One, None, or Many? European Origins and Modernity as a Global Condition, 
129 DAEDALUS 31, 59 (2000). 
24  FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 138. 
25  Lynch, supra note 12, at 341. 
26  McNeely, supra note 21, at 2319. 
27  “World-systems theory” views the world as a system comprised of core and periphery states 
organized in accordance with global divisions of labor based on states’ political and economic 
power. CHRISTOPHER CHASE-DUNN, GLOBAL FORMATION: STRUCTURES OF THE WORLD 
ECONOMY 203–06 (1989); IMMANUEL WALLERSTEIN, THE MODERN WORLD-SYSTEM III 129–30 
(1974). 
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transactions.”28 In this sense, world polity theory shares a rationalist tradition that 
measures regularities in political life by a scientific or positivist methodology.29 
Against this theoretical background, GIL can be defined as a thick set of 
Western-initiated BITs and investment chapters in regional trade agreements, 
such as NAFTA, as well as related case law. Although traceable to customary 
international law as originally developed in the nineteenth and the early twentieth 
centuries, most of its contemporary corpus juris was formulated in the late 1980s 
following the tide of globalization. Throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, customary international law reflected the strategic interests of major 
state powers. In particular, takings of private property by the state were regarded 
as a deviant act that could only take place in exceptional circumstances. Even 
when authorized, expropriation would require the payment of full compensation 
to the affected property owner. Fundamental liberal precepts like these came 
under serious challenge by the mid-twentieth century, however. 
The wave of decolonialization after the end of the Second World War 
drastically transformed such liberal precepts through escalating practices of 
expropriation and nationalization of foreign assets.30 Newly decolonized countries 
pursued not only political independence, but also economic sovereignty. While 
continuing investment from the former colonizers may have contributed to 
economic development of those newly independent countries, the ASEAN 
nations politically shunned Western investment as a lingering legacy of 
colonialism. Instead, these newly independent states sought to indigenize their 
economies by acquiring full control of the infrastructural frameworks left by the 
former colonizers.31 In a time of fierce political contestation, an array of 
ideological influences spanning from Marxism to import substitution fueled these 
inward-looking investment policies.32  
It was not until the 1980s that the winds of change began to influence those 
developing countries that had long adhered to inward-looking development 
strategies. The disappointing outcome of their preferred models stood in striking 
contrast with the glaring economic performance by some Asian countries that had 
chosen an outward-looking (often export-driven), orientation. Once the 
developing countries resolved, or were forced through IMF-imposed lending 
                                                 
28  Meyer, supra note 22, at 145. 
29  See Shu-Yun Ma, Political Science at the Edge of Chaos? The Paradigmatic Implications of Historical 
Institutionalism, 28 INT’L POL. SCI. REV. 57, 61–62 (2007). 
30  THOMAS BREWER & STEPHEN YOUNG, THE MULTILATERAL INVESTMENT SYSTEM AND 
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES 52–54 (1998). 
31  For targeted examples, see LOUIS WELLS & RAFIQ AHMED, MAKING FOREIGN INVESTMENT SAFE: 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY 38 (2007). 
32  TREBILCOCK & HOWSE, supra note 1, at 486–88. 
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conditions, to change gears in their development models, these former colonies 
had to send a strong signal to capital-exporting countries and their nationals that 
they were now ready to welcome foreign investment with due protection. For this 
purpose, the pro-investor terms of BITs were an ideal choice for these capital-
importing states as it enabled them to communicate their commitment to the strict 
economic transitions of the post-Cold War period. 
Not surprisingly, the primary focus of these new investment treaties was the 
contentious practice of government takings of property owned by foreign actors.33 
Even if a state was acting for a public purpose—which would encompass newer 
goals of nationalization34 in a non-discriminatory fashion—the treaties now 
dictated that a government seizing a foreign national’s property had to 
compensate the foreign property holder at a very particular rate.35 The post-war 
authorities that had begun to tentatively affirm a loose customary standard of 
“appropriate” compensation were now displaced in favor of the fuller 
requirement of “prompt, adequate and effective” compensation.36 This guarantee 
of compensation was also extended beyond the paradigmatic case of direct 
expropriation to encompass regulatory or tax measures that might be considered 
indirect public takings.37 Yet there was no attempt in early BITs to delineate the 
level of disruption or impact on a foreign investor sufficient to trigger the 
obligation to pay compensation for “indirect” expropriation. This absolute 
guarantee is typically matched by other broad standards of protection required of 
a signatory host state within early BITs. The most abstract of these is the 
obligation to accord foreign investors “fair and equitable treatment”38 with no real 
attempt across early BIT practice to define the outer contours of this amorphous 
                                                 
33  See BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 52–61. 
34  Am. Int’l Grp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 19 December 1983, 4 Iran–U.S. C.T.R. 96, 109–10 (1983-
III); Amoco Int’l. Fin. Corp. v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 14 July 1987, 15 C.T.R. 189, 233 (1987-
II). 
35  For example, Article III of the Model U.S. Bilateral Investment Treaty provides: 
Neither Party shall expropriate or nationalize a covered investment either 
directly or indirectly through measures tantamount to expropriation or 
nationalization . . . except for a public purpose; in a non-discriminatory manner; 
upon payment of prompt, adequate and effective compensation, and in 
accordance with due process of law and the general principles of treatment 
provided for in Article II(3). 
 UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 198 (vol. 3, 1996). This 
type of provision is by no means limited to investment treaties concluded by the U.S. It is instead 
a feature of most post-war investment treaty regimes. 
36  Id. 
37  Id. 
38  UNCTAD, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT INSTRUMENTS: A COMPENDIUM 209–33 (vol. 1, 1996). 
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standard. At best, certain formulations—especially in treaties concluded by the 
U.S.—eventually link its coverage to treatment at customary international law.39 
Notably, there was no real attempt to delineate these strong treaty 
obligations with core regulatory objectives. On this point, there was a striking 
departure with the post-Second World War attempts to facilitate the reduction of 
barriers to trade in goods in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 
1947, which sought to accommodate key public values. Domestic taxes and 
regulations are fully permitted under the national treatment obligation provided 
that they are not protectionist devices that would distort the bargain on tariff 
reductions among GATT member states.40 Yet other articles within the GATT 
facilitated intervention by states when required to maintain domestic stability.41 
There is even a list of general exceptions that enable states to prioritize key public 
values, such as health protection, over their commitments to liberalize trade.42 In 
the classic BIT model, there is no equivalent of the flexibility for state action 
inherent in GATT Article XX to balance against the strict obligations formed 
during this inception period. 
The unique dispute settlement processes under BITs offer an especially stark 
insight into this project of carving out a strong zone of protection for foreign 
investors. These processes provide the greatest normative departure from the pre-
existing customary regime. The customary rules on diplomatic protection of aliens 
controlled when a state could bring international action for harm to its nationals, 
including economic actors operating abroad. The right to exercise diplomatic 
protection is vested exclusively in the state of the injured national and remains a 
                                                 
39  For example, Article 1105(1) of NAFTA provides: “Each Party shall accord to investments of 
investors of another Party treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable 
treatment and full protection and security.” North American Free Trade Agreement art. 1105(1), 
Can.–Mex.–U.S., Dec. 17 1992, 32 I.L.M 289 (emphasis added). 
40  General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. III(1), Oct. 30, 1947, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 
194 [hereinafter GATT]; Appellate Body Report, Japan–Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, ¶¶ 14–15, WTO 
Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996); Appellate Body Report, European Communities–
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, ¶¶ 97–100, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R 
(adopted Mar. 12, 2001). 
41  For an account suggesting that the American emphasis on domestic stability in the GATT 
negotiations was a projection of New Deal policies on domestic regulatory intervention, see Anne-
Marie Burley, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law and the Projection of the New Deal 
Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MATTERS: THE THEORY AND PRAXIS OF AN INSTITUTIONAL 
FORM 131–33 (John Gerrard Ruggie ed., 1993). For a reflection of this thesis in the GATT treaty 
text consider two particular clauses. GATT Article XII authorizes the use of quantitative restrictions 
to safeguard domestic balance of payments when payment difficulties had resulted from policies to 
secure full employment. GATT Article XIX authorizes emergency action to reintroduce tariff 
protection where a domestic producer (and by extension its employees) is threatened with serious 
injury from import competition. GATT, supra note 40, at arts. XII, XIX. 
42  GATT, supra note 40, at art. XX. 
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discretionary power that the state is under no duty or obligation to exercise.43 
Aside from the sovereign election to champion the cause of the injured national, 
custom required the exhaustion of local remedies as a further prerequisite to the 
exercise of diplomatic protection.44 The rationale here was to ensure that “the 
State where the violation occurred should have an opportunity to redress it by its 
own means, within the framework of its own domestic system.”45 Both of these 
customary practices were eroded after a slow period of maturation of the 
investment treaty movement, which culminated in the new dispute settlement 
processes of BITs. Early generation BITs maintained the classic public 
international law default of state-to-state mechanisms as the sole means of 
resolving disputes in this field.46 The first BIT (between Italy and Chad) to break 
from this mold and include a radical new form of dispute settlement—investor-
state arbitration—did not enter into force until 1969.47 Moreover, only by 1974 
could a clear trend for the inclusion of investor-state arbitration in investment 
treaties be discerned.48 
Under these newer structures, foreign investors as private claimants are 
given standing to bring action in international fora for breaches of treaty 
obligations by host signatory states, and there is no requirement for them to first 
resort to or exhaust domestic legal processes as a condition of such action.49 This 
dramatic elevation of private commercial interests is finessed through the idea of 
arbitration “without privity.”50 State signatories to investment treaties offer their 
consent, in advance, to the jurisdiction of an arbitral tribunal to hear disputes 
between investors and host states. Jurisdiction is ultimately crystallized when a 
foreign investor elects to commence a claim for breach by a signatory state. This 
structure is a conceptually distinct and far more expansive use of arbitration that 
                                                 
43  As stated by the International Court of Justice (ICJ), “[t]he State must be viewed as the sole judge 
to decide whether its protection will be granted, to what extent it is granted, and when it will cease. 
It retains in this respect a discretionary power the exercise of which may be determined by 
considerations of a political or other nature, unrelated to the particular case.” Barcelona Traction 
Light and Power Company Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Second Phase, Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. Rep. 
44, ¶ 79 (Feb. 5). 
44  The exhaustion of local remedies was recognized by the ICJ as “a well-established rule of customary 
international law” in the Interhandel Case. Interhandel (Switzerland v. U.S.), Preliminary 
Objections, 1959 I.C.J. Rep. 6, ¶ 27 (Mar. 21). 
45  Id. at ¶ 27. 
46  RUDOLF DOLZER & MARGRETE STEVENS, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 122, 122–29 (1995). 
47  ANDREW NEWCOMBE & LLUIS PARADELL, LAW AND PRACTICE OF INVESTMENT TREATIES: 
STANDARDS OF TREATMENT 45 (2009). 
48  Jason Web Yackee, Bilateral Investment Treaties, Credible Commitment and the Rule of (International) Law: 
Do BITs Promote Foreign Direct Investment?, 42 L. SOC. REV. 805, 815 (2008). 
49  Jan Paulsson, Arbitration Without Privity, 10 ICSID REV. 232, 233 (1995). 
50  Id. 
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extends the scope of arbitration beyond its traditional role of resolving discrete 
disputes in negotiated contracts between commercial parties. The standing 
consent offered in most investment treaties is usually to a range of systems of 
dispute settlement at international law.51 The most prominent of these is the 
World Bank-based International Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (ICSID), an arbitral institution that specializes in international 
investment disputes. ICSID was formed in 1966, in the eye of the storm of 
expropriatory behavior in the developing world.52 It offers a self-contained 
mechanism to settle disputes between foreign investors and their host states. If a 
state extends its consent to ICSID, under a treaty, its right to espouse diplomatic 
protection is specifically excluded.53 
The aforementioned body of international investment law, manifested in a 
dense network of over 3,000 bilateral and regional investment treaties,54 
constitutes GIL. By the 1990s, GIL, empowered by the triumphant zeitgeist of 
neoliberalism (the “End of History”),55 claimed its place as a global model of 
economic governance. Developing countries subscribed to this model in droves 
as they elected to attract foreign investment based on free market policies.56 The 
number of newly-signed BITs, as well as the number of investment disputes, 
subsequently skyrocketed. While there were only 385 BITs signed from 1959 to 
1989, a staggering 1,857 BITs were concluded from 1990 to 1999.57 Indeed, as 
José Alvarez has observed, “[t]he 1990s . . . were the era when the modern 
investment regime was born.”58 Capital-exporting countries, such as the U.S. and 
E.U. member-states, spread their model BITs to numerous capital-importing 
countries, explaining the isomorphic nature of most BITs signed in that period. 
Moreover, some of these model BITs began to be incorporated into investment 
chapters of certain regional trade agreements, such as NAFTA, which adopted 
conventional investor-state arbitration mechanisms such as the ICSID rules. In 
sum, the dense network of BITs, investment chapters of regional trade 
                                                 
51  These include UNCITRAL rules or arbitration under the processes of the International Chamber 
of Commerce. DOLZER & STEVENS, supra note 46, at 129–30.  
52  BREWER & YOUNG, supra note 30, at 72.  
53  Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other 
States art. 27, Oct. 14, 1966, 575 U.N.T.S. 159. 
54  UNCTAD, Recent Trends in IIAs and ISDS, 1 IIA ISSUES NOTE 2 (2015).  
55  See generally FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (1992). 
56  Kenneth Vandevelde, Sustainable Liberalism and the International Investment Regime, 19 MICH. J. INT’L L. 
373, 382 (1998). 
57  UNCTAD, BILATERAL INVESTMENT TREATIES 1959-1999, at 1 (2000). 
58  José Alvarez, The Once and Future Foreign Investment Regime, in LOOKING TO THE FUTURE: ESSAYS ON 
INTERNATIONAL LAW IN HONOR OF W. MICHAEL REISMAN 617 (M. Arsanjani et al. eds., 2010). 
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agreements, and derivative arbitral jurisprudence from these treaties collectively 
form GIL. 
 
Figure 1: Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS) Cases (1987-2014)59 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B.  ASEAN’s Adoption of Global Investment Law  
As discussed above, GIL is an economic version of world culture that 
transnational actors, both state and non-state, share and advocate as a “policy 
script”60 to guide and control behavior. A dense transnational network—
comprised of government officials, private practitioners (who often have inherent 
incentives to champion strong investment protections), international 
organizations (the IMF and the World Bank), think tanks, and academic 
institutions—“translates” the neoliberal Washington Consensus on foreign 
investment into the operational language of legislation and enforcement.61 These 
“norm entrepreneurs,” often equipped with expertise and organizational 
apparatus, play an important role in the norm cycle of GIL as they help GIL 
spread and cascade so that norms are eventually internalized into the domestic 
                                                 
59  See UNCTAD, supra note 54. 
60  Sarah Sunn Bush, International Politics and the Spread of Quotas for Women in Legislatures, 65 INT’L ORG. 
103, 108 (2011). 
61  Terence C. Halliday & Pavel Osinsky, Globalization of Law, 32 ANN. REV. SOC. 447, 456 (2006); John 
Boli & George Thomas, INGOs and the Organization of World Culture, in CONSTRUCTING WORLD 
CULTURE: INTERNATIONAL NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS SINCE 1875, at 71 (John Boli & 
George Thomas eds., 1999). 
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legal systems of the ASEAN economies.62 Indeed, ASEAN members’ widespread 
use of BITs in the 1980s and 1990s with developed countries appear to have 
motivated such “norm cascade” through “a combination of pressure for 
conformity, desire to enhance international legitimation, and the desire of state 
leaders to enhance their self-esteem.”63 In particular, as “enactors” and “carriers” 
of world investment norms,64 international organizations—such as the IMF, 
World Bank and APEC—strongly advocated trade and investment liberalization 
during the same period. These organizations often “lobby and harangue states to 
act on [global investment] principles.”65 In sum, this norm cycle, especially the 
process of norm cascade and internalization, may explain the isomorphism 
identifiable in substantive investment norms of ASEAN BITs and the subsequent 
AIR.66 
While recognizing possible local deviations, world polity theorists still 
exhibit a firm belief on eventual convergence into the global model of economic 
development.67 Under world polity theory, AIR is ASEAN’s voluntary adoption 
of GIL through its socialization (learning and emulation) with “rationalized 
others,”68 such as developed countries and international organizations, regarding 
world investment culture. ASEAN members are “embedded” in transnational 
investment networks and therefore socialized to “want” GIL.69 World polity 
theory does not view such adoption as being forced by a hegemonic power, as 
world system theory is inclined to do. World polity theorists would argue that GIL 
provided ASEAN economies with a world investment model that is a highly 
rationalized, and thus universalized, form of economic governance, and that 
ASEAN members legitimate themselves in joining this world investment culture.70 
Any local, particularistic divergence from this world investment model, such as 
exclusion of certain sectors from investment liberalization, would in turn suffer a 
legitimacy deficit.71 
In an apparent penetration of GIL into the ASEAN community, BITs 
signed by ASEAN members proliferated in the 1990s, with countries such as Laos 
(with France in 1989), Vietnam (with Italy in 1990), Cambodia (with Malaysia in 
                                                 
62  Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 9, at 896–98. 
63  Id. at 895. 
64  Boli & Thomas, supra note 61, at 34, 73. 
65  Id. at 46. 
66  Finnemore & Sikkink, supra note 9, at 905. 
67  Meyer, supra note 22, at 146. 
68  Boli & Thomas, supra note 61, at 14–17. 
69  FINNEMORE, supra note 7, at 2. 
70  Meyer, supra note 22, at 148. 
71  Id. 
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1994), Brunei (with Germany in 1998), and Myanmar (with the Philippines in 
1998).72 Those BITs concluded by ASEAN members in the 1990s demonstrate a 
high degree of conformity with model BITs promoted by major capital-exporting 
countries (such as the U.S.). Thus, BITs concluded in the 1990s featured common 
core elements, such as national treatment obligations; most-favored-nation 
principle; broad protection of fair and equitable treatment; compensation for 
direct and indirect expropriation; and investor-state dispute resolution. 
Yet in the heyday of ASEAN BITs (mostly concluded between ASEAN and 
non-ASEAN countries), ASEAN members also initiated the formation of a 
collective intra-ASEAN investment regime (AIR). The BITs that concerned extra-
ASEAN investment flows played a decisive role in constructing the AIR. 
Consequently, much of the treaty language in the AIR can be traced to the BIT 
movement. The first version of the AIR, the “1987 ASEAN Agreement for 
Promotion and Protection of Investments,”73 transplanted many of the major 
obligations for investor protection found in BITs, such as adequate compensation 
for direct or indirect expropriation,74 fair and equitable treatment,75 the right of 
foreign investors to repatriate their capital and earnings (regardless of impact on 
the financial system of the receiving state),76 and an investor-state arbitration 
mechanism whose decision is binding as a matter of treaty obligation.77 
The AIR that emerged from the 1987 Agreement subsequently evolved into 
the “1998 Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area.”78 With an 
ambitious goal of establishing “a competitive ASEAN Investment Area,”79 the 
1998 Framework Agreement shifted its strategic focus from investor protection, 
which was emphasized in the 1987 Agreement to the liberalization of intra-
ASEAN investment flow. In the wake of the 1998 Framework Agreement, 
ASEAN members sought “a more liberal and transparent investment 
environment” in order to “substantially increase the flow of investments from both 
                                                 
72  Zachary Elkins, Andrew Guzman, & Beth Simmons, Competing for Capital: The Diffusion of Bilateral 
Investment Treaties, 1960–2000, 60 INT’L ORG. 811, 820–21 (2006). 
73  Agreement among the Government of Brunei Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of Singapore and the Kingdom of Thailand for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, Dec. 15, 1987 [hereinafter 1987 ASEAN Agreement]. 
74  Id. at art. VI. 
75  Id. at arts. III(2), IV(2). 
76  Id. at art. VII. 
77  Id. at arts. X(2), (5). 
78  Framework Agreement on the ASEAN Investment Area, Oct. 7, 1998 [hereinafter 1998 
Framework Agreement]. 
79  Id. at art. 3(a). 
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ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”80 The level of ambition under the 1998 
Framework Agreement was evidenced by determined commitments, such as 
national treatment being extended to ASEAN investors by 2010, and to all 
investors by 2020, and all industries being opened for investment to ASEAN 
investors by 2010 and to all investors by 2020.81 
The AIR has culminated in the “2009 Comprehensive Investment 
Agreement” (ACIA).82 In this latest iteration, the focus shifted from liberalization 
to a more expansive objective of “integration” between ASEAN states. The ACIA 
preamble envisions a “more integrated and interdependent future”83 with 
“economic integration” to be achieved, inter alia, through “joint promotion of the 
region as an integrated investment area.”84 In the same line, with special 
recognition of least developed members, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, and 
Vietnam, development took center stage within AIR, leaving its explicit mark in a 
set of objectives85 and guiding principles.86 The level of ambition among the 
member states when it comes to key objectives (such as investment liberalization) 
has continued to escalate. Under ACIA, ASEAN members would develop a 
“comprehensive investment agreement” that is “comparable to international best 
practices.”87 The aspiration to meet “international best practices” naturally 
benchmarks the long-standing praxis created by the main lawmakers in the field 
being developed by countries, such as the U.S., and international organizations, 
such as the WTO. 
III.  THE LIMITS OF GLOBAL INVESTMENT LAW ’S 
HOMOGENIZING EFFECTS IN THE ASEAN  INVESTMENT 
REGIME  
A.  The Limits of Global Investment Law 
Despite the AIR’s patterns of convergence into GIL, it appears puzzling that 
one can still witness a number of aberrations in the AIR vis-à-vis GIL. While some 
deviations are not uncommon in any local implementation of a powerful external 
benchmark, on close observation, those in AIR are not so much inconsequential 
                                                 
80  Id. at art. 3(a)(i) (emphasis added). 
81  Id. at art. 4. 
82  2009 ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, Feb. 26, 2009 [hereinafter ACIA]. 
83  Id. at recital 2. 
84  Id. at art. 1(d). 
85  Id. at art. 1 (including the strategic goal of using the investment agreement to achieve the “end goal 
of economic integration”). 
86  Id. at art. 2(f) (recognizing the need to grant “special and differential treatment and other flexibilities 
to Member States depending on their level of development”). 
87  Id. at recital 1. 
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anomalies as structural heterogeneities that may qualify the general thesis 
underpinning aspects of world polity theory. These conspicuous heterogeneities 
from GIL can be witnessed in both individual ASEAN BITs and the subsequent 
collective investment project of the AIR. 
Most ASEAN BITs fully preserve the right of the signatory host state to 
regulate the question of admission of foreign investment. The myriad of strong 
BIT protections thus only apply on a post-establishment basis, after foreign 
investment has been admitted into the host state. At its most extreme, this 
structure entitles a state to exclude entire economic sectors from participation by 
foreign investors, which may well be necessary if those sectors had been targeted 
for protected cultivation as part of an infant industry strategy. Even if a state 
chooses to open a given economic sector to foreign competition, they are free to 
impose conditions upon the entry of a foreign investor. In this respect, most Asian 
BITs are conceptually different from a stronger liberalization model that 
characterizes the investment treaty practice of a number of developed countries, 
especially the U.S. and Canada. Those states typically require combined national 
treatment and most-favored-nation treatment at the pre-admission stage, thus 
severely restricting discretionary regulatory mechanisms that prohibit entry, or 
offer it only on conditions that reduce the overall value of the investment to the 
investor.88 
Relatedly, many Asian BITs delineate the operation of substantive 
investment treaty protections (even on a post-admission basis) by reference to 
compliance by the foreign investor with some element of domestic law. At the 
outset, however, it is important to note that there is heterogeneity on this key 
point across the entire field of Asian investment treaty practice.89 Thailand, for 
instance, tends to sit at the most conservative end of a spectrum, as evidenced by 
Article 3(1) of the 1978 Thailand–U.K. BIT, which provides: “The benefits of this 
Agreement shall apply only in cases where the investment of capital by the 
nationals and companies of one Contracting Party in the territory of the other 
Contracting Party has been specifically approved in writing by the competent authority of the 
latter Contracting Party.”90 
                                                 
88  On what the authors call a “full liberalization model,” see Ignacio Gomez-Palacio & Peter 
Muchlinski, Admission and Establishment, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT LAW 242–43 (Peter Muchlinski et al. eds., 2008). 
89  Dato’ Cecil Abraham, State Approval in South East Asian Bilateral Investment Treaties, in INVESTOR-
STATE ARBITRATION: LESSONS FOR ASIA 123–33 (Michael Moser ed., 2008). 
90  Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion of the Investment of 
Capital and for the Protection of Investments, Nov. 28, 1978, at Art. 3(1) (emphasis added). For a 
more recent example of this strategy in Thai BIT practice, see Kingdom of Thailand and the Federal 
Republic of Germany, Jun. 24, 2002, at art. 2(2). 
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The formula under Article 3(1) requires foreign investors to prove that they 
have met very specific and formalized preconditions to entry, not least of which 
is approval in writing by the host state. Unless foreign investors can do so, their 
investments will not be protected under the BIT. Approval—which will often be 
tied to registration under domestic law—is often a technique used by states to 
supervise the grant of benefits to attract foreign investment in key economic 
sectors (including through investment incentives),91 and to monitor specific 
conditions imposed on foreign investors to maximize the development benefits 
to the host state from foreign investment in those sectors (through employment 
of performance requirements such as local content conditions).92 
This type of stringent precondition—requiring a discrete and affirmative 
action on the part of the host state to guarantee coverage of investment 
protection—is also a characteristic of Indonesian and Malaysian BIT practice. For 
example, Article 9 of the 1970 Belgium–Indonesia BIT provides the following: 
[t]he protections afforded to investors by the provisions of the present 
Agreement shall apply . . . in the territory of the Republic of Indonesia only 
to investments which have been approved by the Government of the 
Republic of Indonesia pursuant to stipulations contained in the Foreign 
Investment Law No. 1 of 1967 or other relevant laws and regulations of the 
Republic of Indonesia.93 
Likewise, under the 1981 Malaysia–U.K. BIT: “The said term [investment] 
shall refer . . . in respect of investments in the territory of Malaysia, to all 
investments made in projects classified by the appropriate Ministry of Malaysia in 
accordance with its legislation and administrative practice as an ‘approved 
project.’”94 There have been very few disputes initiated under the individual BITs 
of ASEAN members where a tribunal has proceeded to examine the merits of a 
                                                 
91  For an explanation by Malaysia of its rationale in using this technique, see Philippe Gruslin v. 
Malaysia, ICSID Case No. ARB/99/3, Award, ¶ 17.1 (Nov. 27, 2000). 
92  For the use of local content conditions by Indonesia when regulating foreign investment in the 
automotive sector (which were ruled contrary to the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related 
Investment Measures), see Indonesia – Certain Measures Affecting the Automobile Industry, 
Report of the Panel, WT/DS54/R, Jul. 2, 1998. See also Canada: Administration of the Foreign 
Investment Review Act, BISD 30S/140, adopted on Feb. 17, 1984 (ruling that the Canadian practice 
of enforcing certain undertakings given by foreign investors in order to gain discrete regulatory 
approval to invest in Canada breached the obligation of national treatment in GATT Article III(4)). 
93  Agreement Between the Kingdom of Belgium and the Republic of Indonesia on the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, art. 9, Jan. 15, 1970. For a more recent 
example of this strategy in Indonesian BIT practice, see Agreement Between the Government of 
Australia and the Government of the Republic of Indonesia concerning the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, art. III(1)(a), entered into force Jul. 29, 1993. 
94  Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, art. 
1(b)(ii), May 21, 1981. 
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claim. The obvious reason for this, as we have seen, is that many of those BITs 
provide ASEAN states with the extensive ability to plead non-compliance with 
domestic law as a basis for limiting jurisdiction of the BIT. 
The 1987 Agreement, which was the first version of AIR, continued this 
inward-looking, sovereigntist trend, despite its goal of facilitating greater 
investment flows within the ASEAN community. Most of all, the 1987 Agreement 
effectively restricted treaty protection for foreign investors by subjecting those 
protected investments to formal government approval with possible conditions 
imposed by the host government.95 Concomitantly, this strict threshold for 
investor protection prevented foreign investors from seeking remedies from the 
investor-state arbitration mechanism under the 1987 Agreement. In Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading Pte. Ltd. v. Myanmar, the tribunal refused to hear the investor's claim on the 
grounds that the investor failed to prove that the investment in question had been 
formally approved when the 1987 Agreement took effect.96 Other arbitral 
tribunals outside of the ASEAN context have criticized such formalities as they 
“advance no real interest of either signatory State” and “constitute an artificial trap 
depriving investors of the very protection the BIT was intended to provide.”97 
Indeed, the Yaung Chi Oo tribunal itself admitted that “[t]he 1987 Agreement was 
thus subject to important limitations in terms of its coverage, as compared with 
other bilateral and multilateral investment protection treaties.”98 
The more advanced 1998 Framework Agreement also revealed a seriously 
limited dimension when compared to the typical orientation in GIL, despite its 
expansive mandate to “substantially increase the flow of investments into ASEAN 
from both ASEAN and non-ASEAN sources.”99 In contrast to the detailed roadmap 
on liberalization of restrictions on flows of foreign investment (at least within 
ASEAN), the 1998 Framework Agreement makes no direct reference to the usual 
investment protection mechanisms found in most BITs, such as guarantees of fair 
and equitable treatment; full protection and security; and compensation in the 
event of direct or indirect expropriation.100 On first view, this would seem to raise 
the paradoxical possibility that the ASEAN members are providing lower 
standards of investment protection amongst themselves compared to what is 
offered (via BITs) to foreign investors from non-ASEAN states. Yet on closer 
examination, the framers seem to have adopted a scaffolding strategy that would 
                                                 
95  Id. at art. II(1). 
96  Yaung Chi Oo Trading Pte Ltd v. Myanmar, 42 I.L.M. 540, at ¶¶ 60–62 (2003). 
97  Desert Line Projects LLC v. The Republic of Yemen, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/17, Award, ¶ 106 
(Feb. 6, 2008). 
98  Yaung Chi Oo, supra note 96, at ¶ 23. 
99  1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 3 (emphasis added). 
100  Id. 
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see the new liberalization guarantees (in the 1998 Framework Agreement) apply 
concurrently with the largely protective standards (in the 1987 ASEAN 
Agreement): 
Member States affirm their existing rights and obligations under the 1987 
ASEAN Agreement for the Promotion and Protection of Investments and 
its 1996 Protocol. In the event that this Agreement provides for better or 
enhanced provisions over the said Agreement and its Protocol, then such 
provisions of this Agreement shall prevail.101 
There are a number of problems with this general strategy, as well as with 
the particular framing of this clause. The strategy is certainly an opportunity lost 
for the ASEAN members. Many of the unqualified standards in the 1987 ASEAN 
Agreement reflect the high-water mark of investment protection as articulated in 
BITs, and thus GIL, entered into throughout the 1980s. By the mid to late 1990s 
(especially within NAFTA), a number of states had begun to calibrate those 
standards more carefully in an attempt to better balance investment protection 
with core components of regulatory autonomy. Of course, the new 1998 
Framework Agreement contains a range of very extensive exceptions that are 
designed to supply precisely such a recalibrated balance among the ASEAN 
members. Yet one can easily imagine a scenario whereby there is legal lacuna in 
how the two instruments relate to each other. For instance, the 1987 ASEAN 
Agreement provides for a largely unqualified obligation among member states to 
allow for free transfer of capital102 and also provides for investor-state dispute 
resolution.103 Yet the 1998 Framework Agreement inserts a range of exceptions 
that would enable an ASEAN member to impose capital restrictions. In a 
hypothetical dispute surrounding the imposition of capital controls, the question 
arises whether the ASEAN member can invoke the later exceptions to justify any 
prima facie breach of the earlier obligations. The framing of the loose conflict 
component in the formula above seems to suggest that the provisions of the 1998 
Framework Agreement will prevail if they provide for “better or enhanced 
provisions.”104 Yet, this only begs the question of what evaluative criteria should 
be employed to identify whether the later 1998 Framework Agreement meets this 
standard. From a strict investor protection viewpoint, the earlier 1987 Agreement 
obviously provides a higher, and thus presumably “better,” standard.105 But one 
                                                 
101  Id. at art. 12(1). 
102  1987 ASEAN Agreement, supra note 73, at art. VII (Repatriation of Capital and Earnings). 
103  Id. at art. X. 
104  1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 3. 
105  This seems to be the position taken by the Yaung Chi Oo Tribunal: “[A]rticle 12(1) [of the 1998 
Framework Agreement is] not [to] be interpreted as applying de novo the provisions of the 1987 
ASEAN Agreement, including Article X, to ASEAN Investors. It simply makes it clear that in 
relation to any investment which is covered by both Agreements, the investor is entitled to the 
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might also argue that the increased detail of the 1998 Agreement (especially on 
exceptions) necessarily constitutes “enhanced provisions” (and relatedly, to the 
extent they represent the new sovereign choice among ASEAN member states to 
recalibrate investment treaty exposure, also represent a “better” standard). 
Moreover, the dispute settlement provisions of the 1998 Framework 
Agreement are marked by a further pullback from earlier investment protection 
standards. Specifically, the ASEAN members have confined dispute settlement to 
state-to-state procedures, revoking entirely the standing of foreign investors as 
private claimants to initiate investor-state arbitration (which continues to operate 
only under the 1987 ASEAN Agreement). The wisdom of this choice is 
questionable. The new treaty is characterized by both limited scope of operation 
(in that it only extends to FDI) and a broad range of flexibilities (in the form of 
exemptions from investment treaty strictures for compelling state purposes). With 
this in mind, the likely concerns of unmeritorious instigation of investor-state 
arbitration, as well as the possibility of expansive pro-investor readings, seem to 
be countered (at least partly) by these treaty innovations. The costs of omission 
of investor-state arbitration are very real and significant. Affected foreign 
investors from a given ASEAN state are now left to the mercy of the discretion 
of their home governments to espouse their claim in the state-to-state forum. This 
significant gap in legal protection is vividly illustrated by the Yaung Chi Oo dispute, 
where the Singaporean investor in Myanmar was denied protection under the 1987 
ASEAN Agreement (for failure to show that Myanmar had “specifically 
approved” its investment for the purposes of that treaty), and, although falling 
within the scope of the later 1998 Framework Agreement, had no standing to 
commence a claim under that treaty.106 In cases such as this—where the amount 
of invested capital is relatively small and the economic actor does not have political 
traction within the home state—the prospect of espousal under state-to-state 
dispute settlement process is remote at best. This weak intra-ASEAN investor 
protection is increasingly costly to ASEAN members and tends to necessarily 
impede further economic integration. In particular, considering the more liberal 
extra-ASEAN investment treaties, this asymmetry deters ASEAN members from 
fully taking advantage of synergies between intra- and extra- ASEAN investment 
treaties, tracking the inherent limitations of the “hub and spoke” model in regional 
trade agreements.107 
                                                 
benefit of both and thus of the most beneficial treatment afforded by either.” Yaung Chi Oo, supra 
note 96, at ¶ 82. 
106  Id. 
107  In the regional trade agreement setting, a hub (developed country) can get free access to multiple 
spokes (developing countries), while spokes do not usually offer the same access between each 
other unless they form a “rim” among themselves. Frank Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the 
FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L. L. 539, 557–58 (1995). 
The Limits of Isomorphism Cho and Kurtz  
Winter 2017 361 
Interestingly, the ACIA, as the most recent version of AIR, also exhibits 
asymmetry between intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment treatment, yet 
in a diametrically opposite fashion. Now the ambitious liberalization package 
would apply only to intra-ASEAN investment, abandoning a dual goal of 
facilitating both intra-ASEAN and extra-ASEAN investment flows under the 
1998 Framework Agreement. Even the effective scope of intra-ASEAN 
investment has diminished in comparison with the 1998 Framework Agreement. 
While the 1998 Framework Agreement required ASEAN members to “open 
immediately all its industries for investments by ASEAN investors,”108 ACIA only 
provides a positive list of liberalized areas, such as manufacturing, agriculture, 
fishery, forestry, mining and quarrying, and services incidental to manufacturing, 
agriculture, fishery, forestry, mining, and quarrying.109 
The AIR’s approach to the investor-state arbitration mechanism 
demonstrates a salient departure from GIL, including the NAFTA Chapter 11 and 
its arbitral jurisprudence. The arbitral jurisprudence—especially in cases brought 
against ASEAN member states—is not the only external influence that has shaped 
the contours of the ACIA. The expressed desire to develop an investment 
initiative “comparable to international best practices”110 has also led the ASEAN 
negotiators to draw on a range of external treaty practices. While NAFTA Chapter 
11 is an obvious comparator,111 the ASEAN negotiators have also drawn on 
subsequent changes to the investment treaty practices of the U.S. and Canada 
made in light of their experiences as respondents to cases brought under NAFTA 
Chapter 11. Yet the modeling from that experience is by no means one of simple 
and crude transplant, as is occasionally evident in the practice of some states in 
the international community. The evidence shows that the negotiators have been 
reasonably careful in sifting through those lessons and adapting them to the 
specific context of the ASEAN grouping. 
For instance, NAFTA Chapter 11 excludes subsidies and government 
procurement from the obligation to ensure non-discriminatory treatment of 
foreign investment vis-à-vis domestic counterparts.112 The ACIA does the same, 
but goes one step further. It excludes subsidies and grants from all of the 
disciplines of the treaty.113 This seemingly small distinction is especially significant 
in the ASEAN context. Under NAFTA Chapter 11, subsidies could still be subject 
to investor-state complaints as breaching the separate obligation of fair and 
                                                 
108  1998 Framework Agreement, supra note 78, at art. 7(1)(a) (emphasis added). 
109  Id. at art. 3(3). 
110  ACIA, supra note 82, at rec. 2. 
111  NAFTA, supra note 39. 
112  Id. at art. 1108(7). 
113  ACIA, supra note 82, at art. 3(4)(b). 
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equitable treatment, and that discipline, for a select group of arbitral tribunals, has 
been understood to include a particular constraint against discrimination.114 
Certain forms of subsidies are, by definition, discriminatory in that they are only 
extended to domestic actors and if that reading of fair and equitable treatment 
were to be applied by a hypothetical tribunal, it would preclude their use entirely 
in key settings. That litigation risk, however, is foreclosed in the ASEAN context, 
which is particularly important given the complex economic and political issues 
associated with the use of subsidies. Alan Sykes, for instance, has cast doubt from 
an economic perspective on whether many legal systems (including but not limited 
to the WTO) can differentiate socially constructive subsidies from those that are 
economically problematic.115 
There is also evidence of a clear feedback loop between key investor-state 
arbitral cases and particular negotiation choices made in the ACIA. When it comes 
to the obligation to accord most-favored-nation treatment, a distinct set of arbitral 
tribunals have ruled that that obligation can be used by a foreign claimant to 
import dispute settlement mechanisms from another treaty entered into by the 
respondent host state. In that way, claimants have been able to avoid 
preconditions to the commencement of investor-state arbitration in the primary 
treaty, such as a mandatory period of litigation in the domestic courts of the host 
state. In the first ruling of this jurisprudential line, the Maffezini v. The Kingdom of 
Spain Tribunal relied on a comparative methodology (drawing on different 
formulations within the universe of BITs) to justify its broad interpretation of the 
most-favored-nation obligation, pointing out that where States Parties have 
decided to confine the obligation to substantive rather than procedural 
differences, they have done so explicitly in a given clause.116 The ACIA negotiators 
in turn have provided future tribunals with precisely that sort of explicit direction 
in footnote four, which provides that “[f]or greater certainty . . . this Article shall 
not apply to investor-State dispute settlement procedures that are available in 
other agreements to which Member States are party.”117 
The 2009 ACIA also now includes obligations of fair and equitable treatment 
and full protection and security which had been omitted in the 1998 Framework 
                                                 
114  The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United States of America, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/98/3, Award, ¶¶ 135–36 (Jun. 26, 2003). 
115  Alan O. Sykes, The Questionable Case for Subsidies Regulation: A Comparative Perspective, 2 J. LEGAL 
ANALYSIS 473, 473, 501 (2010). 
116  Maffezini v. Kingdom of Spain, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/7, Objections to Jurisdiction, ¶¶ 51–54 
(Jan. 25, 2000), 5 ICSID Rep. 396 (2002). For an analysis of the justifications used by the Tribunal 
to support its expansive reading, see Jürgen Kurtz, The MFN Standard and Foreign Investment: An 
Uneasy Fit?, 5 J. WORLD INV. & TRADE 861, 877–79 (2004). 
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Agreement.118 The fair and equitable standard has been a primary driver of state 
dissatisfaction with the expanding investor-state arbitral jurisprudence, as it has 
been applied broadly with tribunals often adopting strained interpretative 
methodologies. Here there is a qualitative break with the preferred strategies of 
key NAFTA members in responding to the growing arbitral jurisprudence on fair 
and equitable treatment. The U.S., for instance, has elected to constrain the zone 
of discretion of arbitral adjudicators by explicitly linking fair and equitable 
treatment obligations to the minimum standard of protection for aliens under 
customary international law.119 Yet, if the goal of this treaty recalibration is not 
only to confine protection but also to deliver certainty in adjudication, then the 
wisdom of this method is questionable given the notorious difficulty of locating 
customary international law. For example, the requirements of opinio juris are 
famously difficult to pin down.120 Instead, the ASEAN framers have elected to 
restrict the fair and equitable standard to the one clear dimension that is 
commonly accepted as part of its customary scope: the obligation not to deny 
justice to foreigners in legal and administrative proceedings.121 
B.  Contextualizing Global Investment Law within ASEAN  
While world polity theory is useful in explaining AIR’s general patterns of 
institutional development—especially its isomorphic relationship with GIL—
world polity theory still cannot fully grasp AIR’s unique historical specificity 
characterized by “legacies of founding moments in shaping long-term power 
relations” and the “prevalence of incremental reform over stasis and fundamental 
transformations.”122 Indeed, those general patterns, such as the expansion of 
investment liberalization, are often interrupted by unpredictable, and even 
inefficient, developments.123 
Admittedly, even world polity theorists do not envision perfect adoption of 
world culture by states. They are prepared to concede particular incoherence 
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between dominant world culture and local variations (“decoupling”). Indeed, any 
wholesale importation of world culture into diverse local conditions appears 
infeasible,124 especially as the highly idealized nature of world culture would 
inevitably conflict with various local contexts.125 To that extent, they appear to 
acknowledge that isomorphism does not necessarily mean “equifinality.”126 
Nonetheless, from a highly rationalist—or functionalist—perspective, world 
polity theorists tend to equate local variations with local resistance to world culture. 
They believe that states, “as a matter of identity,” have already committed 
themselves to “such self-evident goals as socioeconomic development.”127 
AIR members certainly obtain their collective identities from GIL, as GIL 
constitutes those members’ actions (policies) regarding international investment 
liberalization and regulation.128 In a Durkheimian sense, those actions collectively 
“represent” GIL. At the same time, however, social actors do not mechanically 
follow global scripts; they may “select” from, and even “modify,” them.129 Thus, 
their identities are also constituted by domestic values. For instance, this is the 
case with the claim to particularity inherent in the vaunted “ASEAN Way.”130 As 
Laurence Whitehead observes, “[N]ational historical memories may filter the 
interpretation of transmissions from abroad.”131 Likewise, Daniel Lynch contends 
that “states differ dramatically on the question of whether to submit to complete 
reconstitution by yielding to global socialization and allowing international symbol 
markets to shape domestic collective identity.”132 In this setting, the level of AIR 
members’ socialization with contemporary peers, or the titular “rationalized 
others,” cannot but be limited. In particular, to tackle unique local—not global—
problems, “different and shifting” solutions will be tried.133 
Against this background, historical institutionalism can brighten analytical 
blind spots left by world polity theory. Historical institutionalists capture subtlety 
and complexity in historical development of international organizations under the 
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notion of “path dependency.” According to Fioretos, path dependency is “a 
process in which the structure that prevails after a specific moment in time (often 
a critical juncture) shapes the subsequent trajectory in ways that make alternative 
institutional designs substantially less likely to triumph, including those that would 
be more efficient according to a standard expected utility model.”134 Likewise, 
Pierson and Skocpol define path dependency as a situational context in which 
“outcomes at a ‘critical juncture’ trigger feedback mechanisms that reinforce the 
recurrence of a particular pattern into the future.”135 The concept of path 
dependency is instrumental in deciphering sociocultural codes shared by ASEAN 
members that tenaciously affect AIR’s institutional development despite a strong 
pro-market headwind from GIL.136 As Roland Robertson trenchantly observes, 
economic internationalization does not lead to the demise of “nationally 
constituted society.”137 
Importantly, initial historical conditions do not determine outcomes per se; 
rather, they are “stochastically” related.138 That set of initial conditions generates 
“its own law of inertia” that will decrease the compliance cost yet dramatically 
increase the cost of departure therefrom.139 Economists often refer to this 
phenomenon as “increasing returns.”140 The notion of increasing returns, and 
therefore path dependency, tends to gain unique persuasive traction given various 
characteristics of political life, such as its collective, intersubjective nature, the lack 
of exit options, its self-reinforcing nature, and the prevalence of interpretive 
heuristics.141 
Historical institutionalism may offer the following explanation regarding the 
tenacious legacy effects of sovereigntism even in AIR’s most recent development 
stage (ACIA). The strong, inward-looking cultural norm, as represented by the 
ASEAN Way, shaped the founding moments of ASEAN. The ASEAN Way can 
be defined as “traditions of consultation and consensus-building and, in particular, 
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the norm of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs,”142 or as a “meta-
regime of non-interference, sovereignty, incrementalism, informality and 
consensual decision-making.”143 This grand principle that became the bedrock of 
ASEAN originated from the resolution of a fierce regional conflict between 
Indonesia and Malaysia over disputed territory in Borneo from 1963 to 1966, 
which is coined Konfrontasi.144 ASEAN countries had to suspend regional 
confrontation among one another to collectively respond to radical communism 
at home and abroad and focus on economic development.145 The ASEAN Way is 
often expounded as a reason for the lack of any major military conflicts since 
ASEAN’s inception as a regional organization.146 
Yet political non-interference can easily translate into “protectionism” in an 
economic sense.147 Once such an overarching norm is firmly established, power 
elites (politicians and bureaucrats) and domestic interest groups (including 
domestic producers of main products) in ASEAN economies configured their 
strategic position on the basis of this inward-looking orientation. This initial 
position also generates increasing returns, or positive externalities, through 
coordination and networking for those particular groups.148 As long as these 
vested interests benefit from the initial arrangement, those beneficiaries have no 
reason to change the status quo. Admittedly, protectionism is ubiquitous especially 
in periods of economic decline, yet in general is destined to be defeated by 
increasing market openness in most economies. Nonetheless, ASEAN’s unique 
path dependency defined by colonial experience and intra-ASEAN power struggle 
placed its priority products (such as agro-based and wood-based products) in a 
strategically important position. Thus, ASEAN economies remain “intransigently 
protectionist,” despite potential benefits from an integrated internal market and 
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economies of scale therefrom.149 This path dependency may explain a puzzling 
asymmetry between intra-ASEAN trade flows and extra-ASEAN flows regarding 
those priority products.150 In these two product sectors, ASEAN trade statistics 
demonstrate a strong extra-ASEAN export bias.151 In other words, ASEAN 
members producing those products elected to target global markets instead of 
ASEAN markets in the face of strong protectionism at the regional level. 
Likewise, a certain critical juncture, such as the 1997–1998 Asian financial crisis, 
may have led ASEAN members to further entrench the early sovereigntist culture 
(such as the ASEAN Way), while other non-ASEAN countries may have 
embraced the same event as an opportunity for transformation.152 Table 1 exhibits 
the strong extent to which ASEAN members prioritized global markets over intra-
ASEAN economic opportunities. 
 
Table 1: Total Imports, Exports, and Intra-ASEAN Exports, by Priority 
Sectors, 2004–2008 (WITS)153  
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008  
Thousand 
Intra-ASEAN 
exports 
     
Agro-based 
products 
1,360,040 933,008 1,144,436 1,687,945 2,788,211 
Automotives 3,283,824 4,191,755 4,690,222 6,416,477 7,987,317 
Electronics 47,876,167 52,268,178 56,110,336 57,982,542 56,928,581 
Healthcare 869,375 987,092 1,235,436 1,685,250 2,000,350 
Textiles and 
apparel 
1,932,309 1,912,064 2,122,545 2,420,349 2,431,291 
Wood-based 
products 
1,143,053 1,230,734 1,237,746 1,394,430 1,424,370 
ASEAN 
exports to rest 
of world 
     
Agro-based 
products 
12,103,978 12,486,983 14,057,296 19,313,273 28,435,800 
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Automotives 11,893,715 15,714,044 18,579,336 25,174,340 27,124,044 
Electronics 215,482,996 239,608,257 265,615,439 266,126,413 267,278,788 
Healthcare 3,506,738 5,692,372 8,071,235 10,049,727 10,167,219 
Textiles and 
apparel 
28,252,081 29,279,163 33,140,705 36,301,953 38,527,881 
Wood-based 
products 
14,874,195 16,074,553 17,000,980 18,327,184 17,661,561 
ASEAN 
imports from 
rest of world 
     
Agro-based 
products 
2,858,852 3,280,498 3,798,554 5,090,003 6,695,704 
Automotives 20,993,758 22,482,370 21,549,767 26,486,024 33,332,207 
Electronics 112,712,493 115,987,928 135,143,296 140,732,507 146,680,531 
Healthcare 5,299,171 6,456,913 7,290,542 8,359,650 9,339,715 
Textiles and 
apparel 
13,597,104 14,690,394 16,692,532 21,385,662 22,541,775 
Wood-based 
products 
865,724 989,336 1,255,923 1,615,914 1,543,718 
 
Furthermore, AIR’s institutional transformations appear more sporadic than 
linear, as world polity or rational choice theorists may envision. Such non-linearity 
in institutional evolution may be accounted for by a phenomenon coined 
“institutional layering.”154 The framers of ASEAN and AIR, as sovereigntists, 
were largely reluctant to transfer their regulatory power over investment to AIR. 
Instead, they preferred adding new regulatory layers to existing institutional 
arrangements (treaties). Thus, one can witness incremental institutional 
arrangements in regulating foreign investment, rather than a full-blown 
liberalization through ceding regulatory power to AIR. 
ASEAN’s sovereigntist path has led AIR to deviate from “historical 
efficiency”155 (full-blown investment liberalization) that might have resulted from 
GIL as part of world culture. Given that divergence from world investment 
culture, AIR can be said to demonstrate “decentering” that protects core local 
values from GIL’s homogenizing power.156 In the same vein, the closer, and 
therefore the more directly, GIL affects core local culture, such as sovereignty, the 
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more likely GIL engenders resistance from the receiving entity (AIR).157 Perhaps, 
the very content of GIL is incoherent and contingent, considering fierce 
competition among powerful actors who desire to advance their own standards as 
GIL.158 The “dialectical and internally contradictory character”159 of GIL may 
provide AIR members with ample justifications for their occasional departure 
from the core values of GIL. 
IV.  CONCLUSION  
This Article has probed the unique ontogenetical path of AIR from two 
opposing perspectives. From the first perspective—reflecting world polity 
theory—AIR has demonstrably emulated GIL ever since ASEAN members fully 
subscribed to neoliberal reform, such as investment liberalization, in the 1980s. 
Saddled with the overpowering trends of globalization, ASEAN members made 
an ambitious paradigm shift toward free and open investment in their 
development strategy. From the second perspective, however, a number of non-
trivial exemptions from GIL that AIR saliently exhibits raise into question any 
unreserved transplant of this world investment culture. Here, ASEAN members’ 
socio-cultural background, epitomized by the ASEAN Way, tends to expound 
these selective divergences. Historical institutionalism frames this second 
perspective and illustrates ASEAN nations’ distinct path-dependency under AIR. 
To overcome a seemingly irreconcilable tension between GIL’s prescription 
of pro-market economic governance and AIR’s apparent departure therefrom, 
one should embrace the fact that the “globality” itself transcends the global 
economy, although the former may still include the latter.160 Applied to the specific 
context of ASEAN, rather than viewing AIR as a mere outlier from a conventional 
normative model, scholars of international law and politics should acknowledge 
the necessity of defining a new form of GIL that is more inclusive and flexible 
than the conventional paradigm. Reimagining GIL in this edifying manner holds 
open the promise of offering policymakers and negotiators innovative conceptual 
tools with which to reconstruct a more effective and legitimate set of international 
norms for investment liberalization and protection.  
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